EFFECTIVE, BUT UNDERUTILIZED

SUMMARY

The following report is issued by the 2015 – 2016 Santa Barbara County Grand Jury regarding the operation of the Los Prietos Boys Camp (LPBC). The Jury found that the facility is well-run and constitutes a major community asset. The Jury also found that the facility is currently operating well below its maximum capacity and recommends that more youth could be served for minimal additional cost. Presently, the LPBC is not open to female juveniles. As the number of female juveniles in incarceration has increased in recent months, the LPBC could be expanded to include them in this program. The Jury found that there is a mentoring program in place for youthful offenders who live in the South County. A similar program should be made available to those who live in the North County.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2016, several members of the Santa Barbara County Grand Jury (Jury) made a scheduled visit to the Los Prietos Boys Camp (LPBC) as part of its annual charge under the *California Penal Code*, *Section 919 (b)*, to "inquire into the condition and management of the public prisons within the county." Throughout the visit, jurors were accompanied by the Director of Los Prietos Boys Camp (Director). Jurors questioned staff and some youth as well as the Director. All were responsive to questions the jurors asked. The Director made a presentation and provided an Informational Packet describing the curriculum including several ongoing Programs, Educational, Vocational, and Fine Arts/Special Activities.

LPBC is a seven day-a-week, 24 hour a day minimum security correctional and treatment facility owned by the County of Santa Barbara (County). The LPBC is located on 17 acres in the Los Padres National Forest, 20 miles north of the City of Santa Barbara. The LPBC is operated by the County Probation Department and provides residential services to selected medium and high risk male offenders, ages 13 to 18. These offenders are considered wards of the Juvenile Court and are sent to LPBC for varying periods of time, usually between 120 and 180 days. Established in 1944, the LPBC now has a maximum capacity of 96 youth.

METHODOLOGY

In addition to visiting Los Prietos Boys Camp and the Susan J. Gionfriddo Juvenile Justice Center in Santa Maria, (Juvenile Hall) the Jury interviewed county staff and officials and reviewed various documents and websites.

BACKGROUND

Program Length

There are two program terms to which a juvenile offender can be assigned, one lasting 120 days and the other 180 days. The youth's in-camp program length is initially determined by the Court using factors such as the juvenile's criminal and school truancy history. Probation and County school personnel evaluate a ward's behavior weekly. Juveniles who display positive behavior can shorten their stay in camp. Alternatively, those who exhibit uncooperative behavior may have their stay extended up to a year to complete their sentence or be sent to Juvenile Hall. The Jury learned that in some cases juveniles at the camp will sabotage their program in order to stay in camp longer and avoid being returned to the community for fear of relapsing into criminal behavior. Juvenile offenders can repeat the program up to three times.

Drug Treatment Program

Drug abuse contributes greatly to truancy, dropout rates, and criminal activity which can lead to long term incarceration. Jurors learned from staff that approximately 90 percent of the incarcerated youth in LPBC have substance abuse problems. There are very few residential treatment programs in the County. LPBC utilizes "Sober Steps", a certified treatment program as well as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. These programs supplement the Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT) program that has been operative at LPBC since 2013. MRT is an evidenced based program designed to encourage the youth to address the thinking and behaviors that contributed to their illegal activities in order to change their behavior. This multifaceted approach gives the youth a controlled, positive, and drug free environment that provides the best possible chance for them to break away from past negative life choices.

OBSERVATIONS

Recidivism Rate

Even though it is currently operating well below capacity, the LPBC has proven to be a good investment of taxpayer funds. The recidivism rate of the LPBC graduates is well below the state average. The Jury believes that the LPBC recidivism rate is also well below the rate of those youthful offenders processed through County juvenile hall. However, because of the complexity of the calculations, the Jury was unable to obtain quantitative evidence to support this belief. In order to compare rates for different facilities, identical calculation methodology is required. The Jury found that different methodologies exist at the State and Federal levels and even between facilities within the county. The County Probation Department is aware of this shortcoming and is working actively to implement a uniform recidivism computation and reporting methodology.

The following table shows the recidivism rate of LPBC graduates for calendar year 2014. The data is sorted by court location. The recidivism rate is calculated using any re-offenses (not including technical probation violations), during 2014 of graduates from the LPBC from 2012 through 2014.

Table 1. Recidivism Rate by Court Location

	Santa Barbara	Lompoc	Santa Maria	Total
Total LPBC Graduates	108	60	104	272
Number of Graduates with No Re-Offenses ^a	76	44	74	194
Number of Recidivists (One or More Re-Offenses) During 3 Year period	32	16	30	78
Percent Recidivism	30%	27%	29%	29%

^a This includes 19 youth with a technical probation violation.

As mentioned earlier, the recidivism rate for LPBC graduates is much lower than that of California as a whole. The three-year California juvenile recidivism rates for the six year period ending in 2007 are shown on Figure 1¹. Although it has declined somewhat since 2007, the statewide rate as of 2008 exceeded 70%. The comparable figure for LPBC graduates in 2014 was 29%.




Figure 1. Juvenile Recidivism Rates for California

Preadmission Screening

This low recidivism rate is partially due to the intensive screening process used to evaluate candidates before admission which includes a medical/physical examination. The most current LPBC Screening

¹2012 Outcome Evaluation Report, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Office of Research, October 2012

form is attached as Appendix A. In addition, the process includes psychological evaluations and mental health history to determine suitability. LPBC personnel also interview youth to determine their level of maturity and commitment to complete the program.

In 2015, 121 youthful offenders were referred for admission suitability evaluation. Of these candidates, 11 (or 9%) were rejected. Rejections occurred either because of the type of offense (arsonists and sex offenders are not eligible), a physical problem, or because the sentence was too short for the program to be effective.

Other Support Programs

A major study of the effectiveness of various intervention and treatment programs was conducted by M. W. Lipsey, Director, Peabody Research Institute at Vanderbilt University in 2009².

His conclusions are:

"Counseling interventions had the largest positive effects on recidivism decreasing it by 13%, followed by Multiple coordinated services (12%), and Skill building programs (12%). The counseling interventions that were most effective were group-based, mentoring focused, and those that had mixed combinations of various types of counseling."

To their credit, LPBC staff have implemented a number of support programs designed to assist the youth in their care in recognizing how their behavior contributed to their incarceration, and, more importantly, how they can modify their behavior in the future. These programs include: individual and family counseling, Moral Reconation Therapy, three different substance abuse counseling programs, a weekly public speaking and leadership skills program, and the "Aftercare" program which helps youth transition back into the community. LPBC also provides some vocational training and a rigorous online education program (Los Robles High School) that operates 12 months of the year and is administered by the Santa Barbara County Education Office. Freedom 4Youth, a non-profit corporation, offers a post incarceration mentorship program that is only available to youth who live in South County. This or a similar mentorship program should be offered to North County youth, as well. These worthy programs are well documented elsewhere and will not be discussed further in this report.

Economic Analysis

The Jury believes that the Los Prietos Boy's Camp is run effectively and efficiently and is a significant asset to the community. The LPBC operating cost is more than offset by savings to society resulting from the higher education level and lower recidivism rate of young men that have participated in the LPBC program.

During 2015, an average of 37 young men were held in custody at LPBC at any given time. This utilization rate is about 70 percent of one dormitory's possible holding capacity (without making capital expenditures). This equates to an approximate annual cost of \$151,000 per occupant³ (\$414/day). This is \$32,000 less than the \$183,000 (\$501/day) per occupant to incarcerate a youth at Juvenile Hall.

² Victims & Offenders, Volume 4, Issue 2, April 2009, pages 124-147, *The Primary Factors That Characterized Effective Interventions With Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Overview*, Lipsey, M. W.

³ \$5.6 M LPBC annual budget for an average of 37 incarcerated youth for 2015.

The LPBC facility includes two dormitories. One dormitory, in use currently, is capable of housing 52 youth at a time. The second dormitory, currently not in use, could house an additional 44 youth, for a total of 96 youth if both facilities were placed in operation. The smaller, second dormitory, once known as the Boys Academy, was used to house the youngest offenders, keeping them separate from the older boys. It closed three years ago because of a decrease in the number of younger juvenile offenders. This dormitory could be used if the program were expanded to house females, keeping them separate from the boys.

California State regulations regarding facility staffing levels also affect the LPBC housing capacity. Current staff is able to care for a maximum of 50 youth. Any youth population greater than 50 would require hiring additional staff.

The LPBC annual operating costs, (\$5.6 M for fiscal year 2015-16) can be divided into two categories: variable and fixed. The variable costs are proportional to the number of youth and include items such as food, medical care, uniforms, and transportation. The fixed costs are the cost of the physical plant, the beds, buildings, lockers, showers, etc. As discussed above, a sharp cost increase occurs at about 50 inmates, due to the requirement to open the second dormitory. Because of State regulations, cost of the staff is considered a fixed cost for the sake of this discussion, when 50 or fewer youth are housed. As an example, adding or subtracting one inmate would not affect the size of the staff. The cost/inmate, however (the total annual facility operating cost divided by the number of students) decreases as shown in Table 2 since the fixed expenses are amortized over a larger number of inmates.

70 20 30 No. of 40 60 80 37 50 55 Youth Total Cost 5.08 5.30 5.60 5.66 5.88 10.00 a 10.20 a 10.40 a 10.60 a (Million **\$**) Annual 254,000 176,667 151,351 141,500 117,600 181,818 170,000 148,571 132,500 **Cost Per** Inmate **(\$)**

Table 2 LPBC Incarceration Cost vs. Number of Youth

As mentioned earlier, average LPBC utilization in 2015 was 37 youth, as shown in Table 2 with cost/inmate of approximately \$151,000. Total facility operating cost is approximately \$5.6 million.

Capacity exists at LPBC to increase utilization of the facility by 30% without increasing operating cost significantly. If the facility were operating near maximum capacity, housing 48 youth, the annual cost/inmate would decrease to about \$120,000/year). Total operating cost would increase only 3% to \$5.77 million/yr.

As discussed in a previous section titled Preadmission Screening, the Jury learned that 9% of the 121 candidates for LPBC commitment were rejected for various reasons. We also learned that 90 boys, or 74%, were ordered to LPBC. The remaining 20 (16.5%) were screened and accepted but, for various reasons, were NOT ordered to the camp. It is this population that the Jury believes constitutes the candidate pool for increasing LPBC utilization.

^a Estimated

Additional Methods of Increasing Camp Utilization

Another possible way to increase use of the existing facilities would be to accept females. Currently, some females are sent out of state to group homes using state and federal funds. A soon to be published UCSB report, entitled "Evaluation of Female Specific Services: Transforming the Juvenile Justice Approach to Girls, 2016" Executive Summary concludes "that a local option, where girls could receive intensive mental health treatment would be preferable to out-of-county group homes". The unused dormitory at LPBC would require almost no modification to accommodate females. Accepting females would give them access to the same intensive mental health services available to the boys. Therefore, the cost for female inmates would be similar to the cost for males.

The need for a facility to house juvenile female inmates is worthy of further study. Although, over the last several years, the number of female offenders has decreased steadily, this year, the number has increased sharply.

Even so, the number of female offenders in Santa Barbara County is not presently sufficent to warrant establishing a separate program for them. The minimum number of female youth for a cost-effective program is approximately 20. It is possible, however, that an arrangement could be reached with the probation departments of Ventura and San Luis Obispo Counties to house and rehabilitate qualifying females from their jurisdictions. The Jury recommends that this possibility be explored. The Jury's preliminary study indicates that a joint program would benefit all participants.

Another possible way to increase use of the existing facilities would be to offer programs of shorter duration. Existing programs of 120 and 180 days could complemented be with 60 and/or 90 day programs. The Jury recommends that this possibility be explored as well.

Benefits to Society

When youth graduate from Los Prietos Boys Camp, (and, in many cases, subsequently from high school) the positive effects are not only felt by the juvenile but also his family. These benefits cannot always be quantified as they may involve improved self-esteem, self-discipline, a resolve to move on to college or a job, and/or to contribute to his family. One youth, when asked what he would do differently when he got out of Camp said he wanted his behavior not "to make my mom cry again." See Appendix B for similar comments from other youth incarcerated at LPBC.

However, numerous papers and studies show that society as a whole clearly benefits in a multitude of financial ways. Before they were incarcerated at LPBC, the majority of the youth were substance abusers, were truant (some for as long as a year), and were found guilty of various violations of the law. This report does not attempt to analyze every detail of the individuals placed at the Camp. However, it is accurate to state that they were all in danger of ending up as statistics, whether it be as high school dropouts, perpetrators of further crimes, victims of crimes, and/or as inmates of local, state, or federal prisons. Beyond that, the youth could become a financial drain on various levels of government and its taxpayers in numerous ways, whether as inmates of jails and prisons, welfare or food stamp recipients,

⁴ Year 2: Systemic Probation Analysis & Girls Group Evaluation, Evaluation of Female Specific Services, Transforming the Juvenile Justice Approach to Girls, 2016 Executive Summary, UCSB and Santa Barbara County Department of Behavioral Wellness, Draft

⁵ See Appendix C, "Memo to Santa Barbara County Grand Jury from District Attorney Joyce E. Dudley, March 30, 2016"

and/or as low wage earners. "The typical career criminal causes \$1.3–\$1.5 million in external costs; a heavy drug user causes \$370,000 to \$970,000. Eliminating duplication between crimes committed by individuals who are both heavy drug users and career criminals results in an overall estimate of the "monetary value of saving a high-risk youth" of \$1.7 to \$2.3 million."

These and more data may be found in Appendix C, "Memo from Joyce E. Dudley, District Attorney, County of Santa Barbara, March 30, 2016".

Based on its investigation, the Jury strongly believes that the Los Prietos Boys Camp is a valuable asset that not only changes the lives of the youth it incarcerates, it also contributes to saving an appreciable amount of money for taxpayers and all levels of government.

CONCLUSION

The 2015-2016 Santa Barbara County Grand Jury examined the operation of the Los Prietos Boys Camp. The camp provides a structured and predictable environment where medium and high-risk youth are encouraged to modify their behavior, develop self-esteem, and prepare themselves to re-enter society. The Jury studied the support programs provided to the youth including the programs that help the youth transition back into society.

The Jury believes that the Los Prietos Boy's Camp is run effectively and efficiently and is a significant asset to the community. The Jury concluded, however, that Los Prietos Boys Camp is not operating at capacity. The cost to house each youth, therefore, is higher than it would be with greater utilization. The Jury concluded that the possibility of expanding the LPBC mandate to include females appears feasible and is worthy of further study.

The Jury also concluded that no countywide definition of recidivism exists to allow evaluation of the effectiveness of various rehabilitation program alternatives.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1

The Los Prietos Boys Camp at its current staffing level can care for up to 50 youth yet the number of juveniles held is less than this number.

Recommendation 1a

That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors direct the Santa Barbara County Probation Department to conduct a study of ways to increase the utilization of the Los Prietos Boys Camp.

Recommendation 1b

That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors direct the Santa Barbara County Probation Department to reevaluate its acceptance criteria and process to develop methods to increase the number of youth who are ordered to the Los Prietos Boys Camp program.

⁶ Cohen, M. A. (1998). The monetary value of saving high-risk youth. Journal of Quantitative Criminology.

Recommendation 1c

That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors direct the Santa Barbara County Probation Department to evaluate the possibility of decreasing the lengths of the programs in order to accommodate more youth.

Finding 2

No similar camp program for female juveniles exists in Santa Barbara County.

Recommendation 2

That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors direct the Santa Barbara County Probation Department to evaluate including female juvenile offenders in this successful program.

Finding 3

Freedom 4Youth offers a post incarceration mentorship program that is only available to youth who live in the South County.

Recommendation 3

That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors encourage the establishment of a similar mentorship program for North County youth.

Finding 4

No standard calculation methodology exists within Santa Barbara County for measuring juvenile recidivism.

Recommendation 4

That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors direct the Santa Barbara County Probation Department to establish a single calculation methodology for juvenile recidivism and utilize it in all future reporting.

REQUEST FOR RESPONSE

Pursuant to *California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05*, the Jury requests each entity or individual named below to respond to the enumerated findings and recommendations within the specified statutory time limit:

Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors — 90 days

Findings 1, 2, 3, and 4 Recommendation 1a, 1b, 1c, 2, 3, and 4

APPENDIX A Los Prietos Screening Form

PLACEMENT SCREENING CHECKLIST

			DATE:	
PROGRAM		PLACEME		
LPBC		SM 🗌	LO SB	
REFERRING DPO:		PHONE NO.:		
		DOB:	AGE:	
ADDRESS:	COURT NO.:	PHONE		
JID #:	_ COURT NO.:	SOCIAL S	ECURITY NO.:	
LIVING SITUATION: PARENTS'/GUARDIAN'S NAM	RELATIVES:	W/FATHER: FOSTER PARENTS:	GUARDIAN: GROUP HOME	: 🗆
ADDRESS:		PHONE	NO.:	
FATHER:		PHONE		
ADDRESS:				
PARENT INVOLVEMENT: C PARENT(S) AND/OR SIBLING			: 🗆	
IMMIGRATION ISSUES:				
PROBATION HISTORY	: Minor in Custody	Yes No Date	of Detention:	
NEXT COURT DATE:		RISK ASSESSMENT S	CORE:	
PRESENT OFFENSE: (CODE#)				
ALL 707 (b) WIC and gang relate	d offenses must include	police report(s)	
(SUMMARY):				
PRIOR RECORD SUMMARY:	(Scan Updated Custody	Log Sheet)		
VICTIMS AT LPBC:				
CO-DEFENDANTS AT L	PBC:			
CO-DEFENDANTS AT LI GANG AFFILIATION: (v	vhich one?)	MON	IKER:	
CONFINEMENT TIME:		(CS)		(CC)
PRIOR ATTEMPTS AT	REHABILITATIO	N: (Include Comple	te/Incomplete)	
PRIOR LPBA:		NO MENTAL HEALT		Yes No
GROUP HOME:	□Yes □Y	No RESIDENTIAL TR	REATMENT:	Yes No
RUNAWAY BEHAVIOR:	□Yes □N	No		
Comments: (If yes to any of the abo	ve, include entry/exit dates, p	program name/location, and if	the program was complete/ii	ncomplete)
PREVIOUS COUNSELING PA	RTICIPATION:			
SCHOOL INFORMATIO)N			
LAST SCHOOL:	ZA1	EDUCATION/GRADE	:	
REG: RE	SOURCE:	_ LH ED	OTHI	ER
ESL IEP _	LANGUAGE: ENG	GLISH	SPANISH	
OTHER (ENTRY IS REQUIRED	FOD MENTAL HEA	I TH HICTORY AND R	MEDICAL INFORMA	TION
MENTAL HEALTH HIS		LIH HISTOKT AND I	MEDICAL INFORMA	(TION)
WIENTAL HEALTH HIS	TORI			

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HISTORY OF SUICIDE IDEATION O If yes, explain:	HISTORY OF SUICIDE IDEATION OR ATTEMPTS: Yes No If yes, explain:					
HISTORY OF ARSON/FIRE SETTING	HISTORY OF ARSON/FIRE SETTING:					
VIOLENCE: (DETAILED DESCRI	PTION OF VIOLENT OFFENSE	(S)				
HOMOSEXUALITY: EMOTIONAL STABILITY: SOCIAL SKILLS/PEER GROUP:	MOLESTATION:	PSYCHOTIC BEHAVIOR:				
MEDICAL INFORMATION PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS DOSAGE: ALLERGIES:						
INJECTIONS NEEDED: INHALER REQUIRED: INJURIES: SCARS:	EPILEPSY: HANDICAPS: OTHER: TATTOOS:					
300 WIC/PHYSICAL/EMOTIONAL SUBSTANCE OF CHOICE:	L ABUSE: DRU	IG USE:				
CURRENT NEEDS OF THE MI COUNSELING REQUIREMENTS: INDIVIDUAL: GROU VOCATIONAL/EMPLOYMENT AS STRENGTHS OF THE MINOR:	SUBSTANCE ABUSE: JP: FAMILY:	ALCOHOL/DRUGS: MENTAL HEALTH:				
STRENGTHS OF THE PARENTS/FAMI	LY:					
FAMILY REUNIFICATION/POST PLACE	CEMENT PLANS / GOALS:					
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:						
_ ACCEPTED _ REJECTED	120-DAY PROGRA	M 180-DAY PROGRAM				
SCREENING STAFF: COMMENTS:	DATE:					
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APPENDIX B

A Gift to my Family, Friends, or the World

In December, 2015, youth at Los Prietos Boys Camp were asked, "If you had one special holiday gift to give to your family, your friends, or the whole world, what would it be?" Below are some of the answers from the boys.

- "If I could give my mom the gift she always wanted, it would be me being successful in life because she told me that that's all she wants for me."
- "A gift to my family is that I will finish my program and get released. Then a gift to the whole world would be to be a better person and help out the community."
- A gift to my family would be getting out and doing good."
- "One gift to my family would be to make them happy by getting out of camp and getting off probation."
- "My gift to my family is to do my program and get home as soon as possible and graduate high school."
- "A gift to my family would be to get out and do good and get off probation and not get locked up no more."
- "To make my mom happy by getting a job and staying out of trouble."
- "It would be for me to give back to society by doing good."
- "Graduate from high school and be a better man."

APPENDIX C

MEMO TO SANTA BARBARA COUNTY GRAND JURY FROM DISTRICT ATTORNEY JOYCE E. DUDLEY, MARCH 30, 2016

Date: March 30, 2016

Responses to Confidential Question from the Civil Grand Jury

Question #1: What are the most recent truancy rates for high schools, broken down by school and/or district? What school year are these statistics for?

Below are the historical truancy rates for *all public schools students grades K-12* located in the County of Santa Barbara from the 2008-2009 through 2014-2015 school year, followed by the current truancy rates for *high school students only* for the 2014-2015 school year. Current and historical truancy rates for the County of Santa Barbara may be found here: http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/dataquest.asp.

A student is considered "truant" under California Education Code §48260 if they are absent from school without a valid excuse for three (3) full days during one school year. The District Attorney's truancy reduction program, the CLASS Program, generally begins working with students once they become classified as truant to stop and/or reduce any further unexcused absences. To date, the CLASS Program has been remarkably effective at helping truant high school students get back on track. Overall, the County of Santa Barbara's overall truancy rate (i.e., all students K-12) has been below the state average since 2011-2012 when the CLASS Program began operating. In the three years prior to the Class Program's inception, the County of Santa Barbara's overall truancy rate was above the state average.

County of Santa Barbara Historical Truancy Rates (All Grades K-12)

County of Santa Darbara Historical Truancy Rates (All Grades K-12)							
	2008- 2009	2009- 2010	2010- 2011	2011- 2012	2012- 2013	2013- 2014	2014- 2015
Santa Barbara County	27.02%	30.70%	30.76%	24.30%	27.60%	23.05%	22.69%
California Average	24.15%	28.32%	29.74%	28.50%	29.28%	31.14%	31.43%
Truancy Program?	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES

⁷ See http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/dataquest.asp (last accessed on March 24, 2016). 2015-16 Santa Barbara County Grand Jury

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Carpinteria Unified

High School	2014-2015 Truancy Rate
Carpinteria Senior High	25.81%
Foothill Alternative High	N/A
Rincon High (Continuation)	47.27%
District Wide (High School Only)	26.4%

Cuyama Joint Unified

High School	2014-2015 Truancy Rate
Cuyama Valley High	25.64%

Lompoc Unified

High School	2014-2015 Truancy Rate
Cabrillo High	40.09%
Lompoc High	44.65%
Maple High (Continuation)	85.71%
District Wide (High School Only)	45.7%

Santa Barbara Unified

High School	2014-2015 Truancy Rate
Alta Vista Alternative High	14.23%
Dos Pueblos Senior High	40.48%
La Cuesta High (Continuation)	83.81%
San Marcos Senior High	49.86%
Santa Barbara Senior High	40.90%
District Wide (High School Only)	43.73%

Santa Maria Joint Union

High School	2014-2015 Truancy Rate
Delta High (Continuation)	85.59%
Ernest Righetti High	35.91%
Pioneer Valley High	21.87%
Santa Maria High	33.91%
District Wide (High School Only)	35.08%

Santa Ynez Valley Union

High School	2014-2015 Truancy Rate
Refugio High	2.17%
Santa Ynez Valley Union High	10.48%
District Wide (High School Only)	10.32%

Questions #2-3: What are some statistics concerning the cost to society, and to the person, of dropping out of high school?

Below is a list of various data and statistics regarding the cost to society and the person of dropping out of high school as well as data and statistics on the connection between truancy and dropping out of high school. Additionally, California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris has produced three reports on truancy in California, which provide a wealth of information that can be found here: https://oag.ca.gov/truancy. Finally, the University of California, Santa Barbara's California Dropout Research Project has produced nearly twenty reports related to this topic that can be found here: http://www.cdrp.ucsb.edu/pubs reports.htm.

- **Fiscal Cost to California**⁸ Each year 120,000 individuals fail to graduate high school. *Each* cohort of dropouts costs the State **\$9.5** billion in gross *fiscal losses* over their collective lives. The costs break down as follows (please note that the *net* fiscal loss is \$6.3 billion due to \$3.2 billion in savings realized from not expending education funds on dropouts):
 - \$3.1 billion in lost state and local tax revenue due to lower incomes of high school dropouts;
 - \$3.5 billion in healthcare expenditures due to higher proportion of high school dropouts utilizing public assistance for healthcare (this equates to an average of \$29,166 per dropout);
 - o \$2.5 billion in crime expenditures (e.g., incarceration, probation); and
 - \$400 million in welfare expenditures (this equates to an average of \$3,333 per dropout).
- Economic Cost to California⁹ The above statistics measured *fiscal* costs, i.e., costs to the State government. However, high school dropouts have an even larger negative effect on our State's economy as a whole. In total, California's economy suffers a loss of \$46.4 billion for each cohort of dropouts over the course of their lives, which equates to a 2.9% reduction in annual Gross Domestic Product. The losses break down as follows:
 - \$6.3 billion in fiscal losses (see above);
 - \$22.4 billion in lost earnings (if these students had graduated they would have collectively earned this additional income over the course of their lives);
 - \$9.5 billion in costs incurred by victims of crime committed by high school dropouts; and
 - \$8.3 billion in lost growth and other externalities.
- **Life Expectancy** High school graduates have a life expectancy of three (3) years longer than high school dropouts. ¹⁰
- **Intergenerational Effects** Only 6% of high school dropouts' children obtain a bachelor's degree or higher.¹¹

⁸ Belfield & Levin, *The Economic Losses from High School Dropouts in California*, The California Dropout Research Project (August 2007).

⁹ Belfield & Levin, *The Economic Losses from High School Dropouts in California*, The California Dropout Research Project (August 2007).

¹⁰ National Longitudinal Mortality Study 1988-1998 (quoted by *Education Matters for Health* by Robert Wood Johnson Foundation).

¹¹ Snyder, Dillow, and Hoffman, *Digest of Education Statistics* (2005) (quoted by *Education Matters for Health* by Robert Wood Johnson Foundation).

²⁰¹⁵⁻¹⁶ Santa Barbara County Grand Jury

- **Earning Ability** High school graduates earn \$9,000 more per year and \$370,000 more over their life time than high school dropouts. Graduates are more likely to be working (68% more likely for males; 50% more likely for females) and to be employed in jobs with health insurance and pension plans (by 18-20 percentage points for each benefit), compared to high school dropouts. Solve the property of the propert
- Truancy Leads to Dropping Out Students with ten (10) or more absences in the 10th grade are three (3) times more likely to drop out of high school than those with less than 10.¹⁴
- **Welfare Assistance** High school dropouts are 2.5 times more likely to be on welfare than high school graduates. More than two-thirds of all high school dropouts will use food stamps during their working life; a high school graduate is 68% less likely to be on any welfare program, compared to a dropout. ¹⁶
- Lost School Funding During the 2010-2011 school year, due to truancy public schools in the County of Santa Barbara lost \$14,422,070 in Average Daily Attendance (ADA) funding. This number has remained relatively consistent throughout the last few years. ADA provides funding from the State to local schools based on their average attendance rates. Therefore, if students are truant the attendance rate drops and funding drops accordingly.
- Connection to Incarceration For high school dropouts between the ages of 16 and 24, incarceration rates are 63 times higher than among college graduates. While there is no direct link between incarceration and dropping out, the data is evidence that dropouts are exposed to many of the socioeconomic factors that are gateways to criminal activity. Nationwide, 68% of state prison inmates are high school dropouts. Nationwide, 68% of state prison inmates are high school dropouts.

¹² Doland, Give Yourself the Gift of a Degree, Employment Policy Foundation 2001.

¹³ Belfield, C. & Levin, H. (2007). *Policy Brief 1: The economic losses from high school dropouts in California*. Santa Barbara, CA: California Dropout Research Project, UCSB.

¹⁴ Balfanz and Byrnes, *The Importance of Being in School: A Report on Absenteeism in the Nation's Public Schools*, May 2012, at p. 28.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Dept. of Education, *Manual to Combat Truancy* (1996) *available at* https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/Truancy/index.html.

¹⁶ Belfield, C. & Levin, H. (2007). *Policy Brief 1: The economic losses from high school dropouts in California*. Santa Barbara, CA: California Dropout Research Project, UCSB.

¹⁷ Andrew Sum, et al., *The Consequences of Dropping Out of High School*, Northeastern University, Center for Labor Market Studies (October 2009), at p. 9, *available at* http://www.northeastern.edu/clms/wp-content/uploads/The_Consequences_of_Dropping_Out_of_High_School.pdf.

¹⁸ Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice. (2003, January). *Education and corrections populations*. Retrieved on June 1, 2007 from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ecp.htm
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- **Living in Poverty** High school dropouts are nearly 25% more likely than high school graduates to live at or below the poverty level. High school dropouts had a poverty rate of 30.8% in 2009 compared to 23.7% for people whose highest level of education is a high school diploma. ¹⁹
- Connection to Becoming a *Victim* of Crime One study, conducted in Baltimore, Maryland, found that 92% of juvenile victims of violence are chronically truant, ²⁰ and another study conducted in San Francisco, California, found that 94% of murder victims under the age of 25 were high school dropouts. ²¹

Questions #4-5: What are some statistics concerning the savings to society, and to the person (including juveniles), of avoiding interaction with the justice system?

Below is a list of various data and statistics regarding the savings to society and individuals due to avoiding or reducing contact with the criminal justice system.

- The Cost of a Life of Crime The typical career criminal causes \$1.3–\$1.5 million in external costs; a heavy drug user causes \$370,000 to \$970,000. Eliminating duplication between crimes committed by individuals who are both heavy drug users and career criminals results in an overall estimate of the "monetary value of saving a high-risk youth" of \$1.7 to \$2.3 million.²²
- The Annual Per Prisoner Cost of Incarceration California spends \$47,102 per year to incarcerate one person in state prison.²³ Similarly, an adult housed in county jail costs an average of \$28,000 per year and housing a juvenile in juvenile hall costs an average of \$65,000 per year.²⁴ While some costs, such as facility upkeep and maintenance, are fixed, by lowering incarceration rates the State would realize significant savings in incarceration costs.
- Cost Savings by Reducing Recidivism A 10% reduction in recidivism would save California \$233 million annually. ²⁵

http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2011/pewstateofrecidivismpdf.pdf.

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¹⁹ National Center for Education Statistics, *Youth Indicators 2011*, Table 31 *available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012026/tables/table 31a.asp.*

²⁰ Kamala D. Harris, *In School + On Track*, at 34 (quoting The Office of Youth Violence Prevention, Baltimore City Health Department (Aug. 2009), *available at*

http://www.baltimorehealth.org/info/2009 08 31 YouthViolenceReport.pdf).

²¹ Kamala D. Harris, *Pay Attention Now or Pay the Price Later: How Reducing Elementary School Truancy Will Improve Public Safety and Save Public Resources*, City and County of San Francisco District Attorney's Office (2010).

²² Cohen, M. A. (1998). The monetary value of saving high-risk youth. Journal of Quantitative Criminology.

²³ Legislative Analyst's Office, *What does it cost to incarcerate an inmate?* (2008-2009) *available at* http://www.lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6 cj inmatecost.

²⁴ Id., (2005-2006) at http://www.lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/2 cj county spending.

²⁵ Urahn, S. *State of Recidivism: The Revolving Door of America's Prisons*, The PEW Charitable Trusts, p. 26, Exhibit 4, *available at*

- Negative Economic Effects of Incarceration on Prisoners By age 48, the average former inmate has earned \$179,000 less than if he had never been incarcerated. Serving time in prison reduces annual employment by 9 weeks and annual earnings by 40%. ²⁶
- **Effect on Families** 54% of inmates are parents of minor children. Family income is reduced by 22% while the father is incarcerated. Children of incarcerated fathers are almost 6 times more likely to be expelled or suspended from school than children with fathers who are not incarcerated.²⁷
- **High School Dropouts and Criminal Activity** High school dropouts are involved in 48% of all criminal activity. ²⁸ Research suggests that lack of economic opportunities greatly contributes to this oversized representation of high school dropouts involved in crime.
 - Significant increases in high school graduation rates will reduce violent crimes, including rape and murder, by 20%, will reduce property crimes by 11%, and drug crimes by 12%.²⁹
 - Specific to California, increasing the graduation rate by 10% would prevent 500 murders and more than 20,000 aggravated assaults.³⁰
- **Justice System Savings Per High School Graduate**³¹ Each high school graduate saves the State of California and local government an average \$21,370 in justice system costs, and the Federal government saves an additional \$10,580 in justice system costs. The statistics are even starker when broken down by gender and ethnicity. For example, each Hispanic male high school graduate saves the State of California and local government an average \$33,870, and the Federal government saves an additional \$16,590.
- **Cost to Victims** As discussed above, each cohort of high school dropouts causes \$9.5 billion in costs to the victims of their collective crimes.³²

²⁶ Western, B. & Pettit, B., *Collateral Costs: Incarceration's Effect on Economic Mobility*, The PEW Charitable Trusts, p. 4, *available at*

http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf. ²⁷ Id. at 5.

²⁸ Wolf Harlow, C., *Education and Correctional Populations*, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, U.S. Department of Justice (2003).

²⁹ Belfield & Levin, *The Economic Losses from High School Dropouts in California*, The California Dropout Research Project (August 2007).

³⁰ Fight Crime: Invest in Kids California, *School or the Streets: Crime and California's Dropout Crisis* (2007) at p. 6

³¹ Belfield & Levin, *The Economic Losses from High School Dropouts in California*, The California Dropout Research Project (August 2007), at p. 27 and Table 13.

³² *Id*.

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